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ABSTRACT
There seems to be no limit to the kinds of atrocities that are
committed during armed conflicts. During World War II, the Nazi
regime committed unprecedented horrors that no legal system had
foreseen. During the wars in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, combatants
engaged in forms of cruelty that the law had not anticipated. Even
now, in the conflict in Syria, combatants are using novel weapons to
inflict harms for which the law cannot fully account. When faced
with novel harms, how should prosecutors respond? They cannot
simply create from whole cloth a brand-new crime; doing so would
violate the defendant’s rights. And they cannot simply ignore the
conduct if they are to do their jobs effectively and deliver justice to
victims and perpetrators.
This Article shows how prosecutors can accomplish these
seemingly contradictory goals. I argue that when faced with novel
conduct, prosecutors should rely on a three-step process. First, they
must identify with some precision the harms associated with the
allegedly criminal conduct. Second, they must show that these
harms are similar in type and magnitude to harms associated with
established crimes. Third, they must show that the new crime is
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different enough from the established crime to justify using the
novel crime.
Using a harms-based approach will allow prosecutors to address
novel harmful conduct more effectively and will help to ensure that
harms that have been ignored for too long will be treated more
appropriately. For much of the history of armed conflicts, harms
inflicted on women and girls were either ignored or woefully
inadequately addressed. A harms-based approach can begin to
close this accountability gap by ensuring that wrongful conduct,
regardless of the status of the victim, is fully addressed.
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THE PROBLEM OF INNOVATION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW

An intractable problem in international criminal law is how to
define novel crimes.1 Human cruelty seemingly has no end. Every
conflict brings new conduct that victims, advocates, and scholars
believe must be punished using criminal law.2 For prosecutors, this
creates a common but difficult challenge: how to use existing law to
address novel or unusual conduct. International criminal law
cannot stand still. It must evolve to fulfill the expectations of its
proponents: ending impunity, providing recourse and justice for
victims, and contributing to transitional justice.3 What makes this
particularly challenging is the legality principle. The legality
1
Many of these innovations have been in the characterization of novel
conduct, which is the principal focus of my analysis. See Janet Halley, Rape at Rome:
Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive
International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 49-70 (2008) (arguing that crimes
against women and girls should be treated with different international criminal law
and showing how a feminist jurisprudence could facilitate that goal); Darryl
Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 925,
933-46 (2008) (arguing that judicial interpretation of contested provisions of
international criminal law has produced innovations that are contrary to norms of
due process); Sylvain Vité, Between Consolidation and Innovation: The International
Criminal Court’s Trial Chamber Judgment in the Lubanga Case, in 15 YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 2012, 61, 70-76 (Terry D. Gill et al. eds., T.M.C.
Asser Press 2014) (analyzing decision of the International Criminal Court that
addressed innovative means of criminalizing the use child soldiers in armed
conflicts). Other innovations have come with respect to forms of criminal liability.
For a thorough exploration of the development of alternative forms of liability, see
generally Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International
Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 77 (2005) (critically analyzing the development of
various forms of vicarious liability in international criminal law).
2 See, e.g., W.H. Lawrence, Nazi Death Camp a Scene of Horror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 1944 (describing discovery and details of concentration camp in Estonia); The
Nuremberg Judgment, reprinted in 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 922,
949-51 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972) (describing novel Nazi practice of using
concentration camps to terrorize the civilian population); Norimitsu Onishi, Sierra
Leone Measures Terror in Severed Limbs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1999, at A3 (describing
new phenomenon of combatants hacking off the hands of civilians during the
armed conflict in Sierra Leone); Max Fisher, What Makes Syria’s ‘Barrel Bombs’ So
Scary,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
24,
2013,
1:31
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/12/24/what-m
akes-syrias-barrel-bombs-so-scary/ [https://perma.cc/UMB4-24S7] (describing
barrel bombs as “latest tool of terror” in the war in Syria).
3
For a thorough discussion of the various objectives of international criminal
law, see generally Patrick J. Keenan, The Problem of Purpose in International Criminal
Law, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 421 (2016).
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principle requires, in part, “that conduct must be criminalized and
penalties fixed in advance of any criminal prosecution.”4 A strict
interpretation of this principle would mean that those seeking to
prosecute a defendant for novel criminal conduct must use an
existing charge even if the existing crime does not adequately
describe the harmful conduct.5 International criminal tribunals thus
face a dilemma: how to account for novel conduct while respecting
one of the foundational principles of international criminal law. Put
slightly differently, how should doctrinal innovation take place in
international criminal law?
Because international criminal law is a developing field, the
process of defining crimes is different than in domestic courts.6 In
international criminal tribunals, judges determine, after the
allegedly criminal conduct has occurred, whether prosecution7 and
punishment is consistent with the law.8 In the main, it is in this way
that international criminal law evolves. Contrast this with domestic
criminal law, in which the law evolves both through legislative
Significant innovations in
processes and judicial rulings. 9
international criminal law are often met with a similar criticism: that
the new crime for which a morally blameworthy defendant was
being held accountable was not defined as a crime at the time the
4
Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of
Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119, 121 (2008).
5
For a thorough history of the ways that international criminal tribunals have
treated the legality principle in their rulings, see generally id. at 125-41.
6
For just a small sample of the ways in which international criminal law is
still evolving, see generally Theodor Meron, Procedural Evolution in the ICTY, 2 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 520 (2004) (analyzing evolutions in international criminal
procedure); Phillip Weiner, The Evolving Jurisprudence of the Crime of Rape in
International Criminal Law, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1207 (2013) (examining the ways that
international criminal tribunals have begun to prosecute rape committed during
times of armed conflict); Nancy Amoury Combs, Grave Crimes and Weak Evidence: A
Fact-Finding Evolution in International Criminal Law, 58 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47 (2017)
(arguing that international criminal institutions have evolved rules for assessing
evidence that are not always consistent with the written rules of procedure).
7
Van Schaack, supra note 4, at 140.
8
For example, Beth Van Schaack has argued that international criminal law
differs from domestic criminal law because there is no “standing world legislature
that can fill interstices and lacuna, modernize ancient prohibitions, or fix faulty
formulations.” Id. at 137.
9
For a discussion of the complex social and legal forces that contribute to the
evolution of domestic criminal law, see generally Kay L. Levine, The External
Evolution of Criminal Law, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1039 (2008). See also Ben Rosenberg,
The Growth of Federal Criminal Common Law, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 193, 210-14 (2002)
(describing the ways that federal criminal law evolves, which implicate both
statutes and judicial decisions).
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acts were committed.10 Proponents of prosecution typically rely on
arguments that any defendants who committed terrible acts are
unlikely to be held accountable elsewhere and must have known
that their conduct was criminal. 11 Those arguing for strict
enforcement of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege have the
unenviable task of arguing that admittedly harmful acts are not
being characterized appropriately under the law. To many scholars
and advocates, the application of the legality principle appears
decidedly unprincipled.12 Prosecutors have succeeded in creating
10 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 197198 (Feb. 22, 2008) (addressing parties’ arguments regarding the application of the
legality principle to the novel crime of forced marriage). For a scholarly
examination of such claims, see generally Jordan J. Paust, Nullum Crimen and Related
Claims, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321 (1997).
11
The argument against creating new laws or tribunals is not new. See, e.g.,
Charles E. Wyzanski, Nuremberg: A Fair Trial? A Dangerous Precedent, ATLANTIC
(April
1946),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1946/04/nuremberg-a-fair-tria
l-a-dangerous-precedent/306492/ [https://perma.cc/G5XT-MQ8V] (arguing that
the conduct of the Nazis was abhorrent, but that the new charges and the new
tribunal were not consistent with existing law). For a thorough weighing of the
issues in a contemporary context, see Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-200414-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child
Recruitment) (May 31, 2004). There, the defense objected to charges of recruiting
child soldiers. Id. ¶ 1. The majority of the court held that the novel charge was
permissible because the elements of the offense were contrary to international
humanitarian law and subject to prosecution in the domestic legal systems of many
states. Id. ¶¶ 50-51, 54. Noteworthy for my purposes is the dissent. Justice
Robertson wrote that the legality principle can be “highly inconvenient - especially
in relation to conduct which is abhorrent or grotesque.” Prosecutor v. Norman,
Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of
Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson ¶ 12
(May 31, 2004). Justice Robertson acknowledged that the conduct was harmful but
argued that it was not illegal at the time it was committed. Id. ¶ 13. He argued that
in most legal systems it is possible to determine a date certain on which particular
conduct becomes illegal. Id. ¶ 12. But in the international context, such a specific
date is often difficult to discern. Id. In the face of this, he cautioned that
“international law judges” must resist the temptation to circumvent the legality
principle to permit the prosecution of conduct “which they regard as seriously antisocial or immoral.” Id.
12 See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 4, at 133-72 (analyzing in detail the various
ways that international criminal tribunals have eroded the legality principle). Van
Schaack concludes that although the legality defense

is a frequent defense in ICL in the face of novel substantive charges and
forms of responsibility or expansive interpretations of established
doctrines. . . . [International criminal] tribunals have allowed defendants
to be prosecuted for offenses, or under forms of responsibility, that were
not part of positive law at the time the defendants acted.
Id. at 172.
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new crimes and theories of liability and in expanding the boundaries
of existing crimes.13
In this Article, I argue that international criminal tribunals can
rely on an analysis of the type and magnitude of harm caused by the
underlying conduct to determine whether novel conduct may be
subject to prosecution. In the past, tribunals have conducted this
analysis to determine whether the underlying novel conduct is
sufficiently similar to conduct already subject to prosecution to
satisfy the legality principle. To be sure, tribunals still engage in
some of the traditional legality analysis by considering the elements
of the novel offense, how well they map onto existing crimes, and
other factors.14 But increasingly, the approach that has the most to
commend is the harms analysis.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Section II, I discuss what
exactly constitutes a harms-based approach. I argue that under such
an approach, prosecutors would be required to define precisely the
harms caused by the novel conduct, demonstrate that those harms
are similar to those caused by established crimes, and show that the
new crime is not identical to existing crimes. In this Section, I also
show that a harms-based approach is consistent with the existing
law and should be satisfactory to some of the leading theories of
international criminal law. In Section III, I show how a harms-based
approach might work in cases. I argue that this approach would
allow prosecutors to address community-based harms through the
law of pillage and address environmental harms.
Before moving on, a short clarification is in order. I do not argue
that equivalence of harms should be the only criterion by which to
determine if an act should be subject to international criminal
prosecution. Recognizing a wider range of harms is important for
the law to fulfill its potential, but equally important is attention to
basic due process norms that a fair criminal procedure would

13
See, e.g., Susana SáCouto, Leila Nadya Sadat & Patricia Viseur Sellers,
Collective Criminality and Sexual Violence: Fixing a Failed Approach, 33 LEIDEN J. INT’L
L. 207, 213-18 (2020) (describing an increase in prosecution of rape and sexual
assault in the ad hoc tribunals and analyzing the various reasons for the increase);
see also Danner & Martinez, supra note 1, at 103-31 (describing the development of
new modes of liability that had the effect of expanding liability and easing the
burden on prosecutors).
14 See generally Van Schaack, supra note 4, at 133-72 (analyzing the process by
which international criminal tribunals evaluate legality defense claims).
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demand.15 M. Cherif Bassiouni, arguing that international criminal
law should be attentive to criminal law issues, provided a useful
framework of the necessary characteristics of an international
crime.16 Bassiouni argued that, among other things, international
crimes must be specified in an international convention or under
customary international law with sufficient particularity to allow
the defendant to respond to the charges.17 My approach is not an
argument in favor of returning to “rudimentary” processes applied
at the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.18 Instead, I argue that there
is increased space in the law to attend to harms that have not been
fully considered thus far.
Despite this caveat, there are important policy reasons that
support a harms-based analysis.
International criminal law
continues to evolve in significant ways and some of the most
consequential changes have occurred in novel ways that have not
yet been fully explored. As international criminal law moves away
from a rigid, category-based approach to defining crimes towards a
harms-based approach, there is space for international criminal law
to address more unwanted conduct and come closer to fulfilling its
potential. In an attempt to ensure that the cases they prosecute
account for as many harms as possible, prosecutors have created
new substantive crimes and found ways to accommodate these new
crimes into the broad existing categories of crimes against humanity

15
There is a small but growing literature on the procedures followed in
international criminal tribunals. NANCY AMOURY COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT
FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS (2010), meticulously documented the ways that many international
criminal tribunals have based their decisions on shaky evidence. See also Kai
Ambos, International Criminal Procedure: “Adversarial”, “Inquisitorial” or Mixed?, 3
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (2003) (describing the sometimes confused procedural
issues that affect cases in international criminal tribunals); Gregory S. Gordon,
Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 641-70 (2007) (analyzing the criminal procedural
characteristics and deficits of international criminal tribunals from Nuremberg
through the international criminal court). See generally Diane Marie Amann,
Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an International Context,
75 IND. L.J. 809 (2000) (analyzing the means by which domestic criminal procedure
rules and norms become integrated into international criminal tribunals).
16
M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International
Criminal Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 27, 28 (1983).
17
Id.
18
See generally Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by
International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 569-71 (2006) (describing the
rudimentary provisions on criminal procedure in the London and Tokyo Charters).
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or genocide.19 I show how the harms-based approach has been used
to expand the bounds of international criminal law by defining new
crimes or new modes of commission for existing crimes. This has
happened largely in an organic, ground-up manner: prosecutors
listen to victims and their advocates to understand the true harms
caused by the perpetrators, then craft charges to fit these harms.
This change is noteworthy for several reasons. First, it shows how
victims can exert power in a juridical institution to nudge the law
forward even when states or others push back. Second, it shows that
conventional accounts of how the law changes—which focus almost
exclusively on states—can miss important changes happening at the
ground level. Finally, it shows how international law can take
account of harms to vulnerable victims when other avenues are
closed to those actors. For example, some scholars and advocates
have long pushed for international criminal law to address harms
done to the environment or to non-human species. 20 If the
conception of harm is broadened, there might well be space in the
law to address climate crimes. Similarly, this approach might
simplify attempts to arrive at a definition of terrorism.
II. A HARMS-BASED APPROACH
On July 13, 2005, a young woman testified before the Special
Court of Sierra Leone about the abuse she suffered during the wars
in West Africa.21 Known in the transcript only as Witness TF1-094,
she told the court about the day the fighters from the Sierra Leone
Army—one of the many warring factions in the complex conflict—
came to her village. 22 The fighters rounded up civilians and
separated them into groups.23 They killed her parents and many
See discussion infra Part II.
For a discussion on international criminal law and harm to non-human
species, see Lynn Berat, Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward a Crime
of Geocide in International Law, 11 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 327, 340-48 (1993).
21
Trial Transcript at 24-57, Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T
(July 13, 2005), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Transcripts/AFRC/AFRC071305.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CZ8-RTCX].
22
Id.
23
Id. at 27. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was created as a joint endeavor
involving the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone “to prosecute
persons who bear the greatest responsibility” for the violence in Sierra Leone in the
late 1990s. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
19
20
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others in the village.24 She was captured along with other civilians
and claimed by one of the fighters, whom she identified only as
Andrew.25 He and the other fighters took their captives to another
village, where Andrew raped Witness TF1-094 for the first of many
times.26 She testified that she had not yet had her first period when
she was raped for the first time.27 Andrew kept her with him and
continued to abuse her. Within a month of her captivity, she was
pregnant.28
Andrew considered Witness TF1-094 to be his “wife,” 29 and
required her to cook, clean, and do his laundry, among many other
chores. 30 If she refused him, he would have killed her. 31
Throughout her pregnancy, she was forced to move from village to
village to support Andrew and his fellow fighters.32 She was beaten
with a stick for walking too slowly when she was six months
pregnant.33 When she was seven months pregnant, Andrew was
killed in a battle.34 Her baby was stillborn two months later.35
What happened to Witness TF1-094 was tragically common in
the war in Sierra Leone.36 Prosecutors presented the testimony of an
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1(1), Jan. 16,
2002,
2178
U.N.T.S.
137
[hereinafter
Sierra
Leone
Agreement],
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202178/v2178.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26MA-TZXE].
24
Trial Transcript at 27, Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T (July
13,
2005),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Transcripts/AFRC/AFRC071305.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CZ8-RTCX].
25
Id. at 28.
26
Id. at 29.
27
Id. at 28.
28
Id. at 29.
29
Id.
30 Id. at 32.
31 Id. at 29, 32.
32 Id. at 29-45.
33 Id. at 41.
34 Id. at 46.
35
Id.
36
The history of violence against women, including widespread sexual
violence, is beyond the scope of this Article. For a thorough analysis of these issues,
see generally CHRIS COULTER, BUSH WIVES AND GIRL SOLDIERS: WOMEN’S LIVES
THROUGH WAR AND PEACE IN SIERRA LEONE (2009); Sexual Violence Within the Sierra
Leone Conflict, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 26, 2001, 10:39 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2001/02/26/sexual-violence-within-sierra-leone-co
nflict [https://perma.cc/2228-GC2X] (reporting on atrocities committed by all
major combatant parties, including the Revolutionary United Front, the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council, the Civilian Defense Forces, and smaller groups).
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expert witness who described what she called “bush wives.” 37
These were young women, like Witness TF1-094, who were
subjected to both gruesome sexual violence and forced to act as a
“wife” to their captors and abusers.38
What is noteworthy about this case, and a handful of others, is
that they show how prosecutors might use space in the law to
address harms that are not currently fully addressed by other
crimes. Before moving on, it is important to state clearly what I
mean by a harms-based approach. To convince a court that novel
wrongdoing should be treated as a new crime, prosecutors attempt
to prove that the harms associated with the proposed new crime are
of a similar type and magnitude as harms associated with an
existing, established crime.39 To accomplish this, prosecutors might
argue that the harms involved the same or similar rights—like the
right to bodily integrity, for example—and that their violation is as
costly to victims as the harms associated with established crimes.
This part of the analysis turns on convincing the court that the harms
are similar to each other.
But even as they attempt to show that the harms are sufficiently
similar as to satisfy the legality principle, prosecutors must also
show that the proposed crime is different from existing crimes. 40
37
Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 233, 88 n.419
(June 20, 2007).
38 Id. ¶ 991.
39
This part of the analysis is similar to the consideration of the gravity of an
offense that international criminal tribunals conduct in many cases. In cases
alleging that the defendant’s conduct amounted to the crime against humanity of
other inhumane acts, prosecutors must show that the defendant’s actions “are
sufficiently similar in gravity to” other acts listed in the crimes against humanity
statute. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 198 (Feb. 22,
2008). In addition to its doctrinal importance, an analysis of the gravity of an
offense is “the primary conceptual foundation of international law’s authority to
administer criminal justice.” Margaret M. deGuzman, How Serious are International
Crimes? The Gravity Problem in International Criminal Law, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 18, 20 (2012). Indeed, the International Criminal Court must determine that a
case is “of sufficient gravity” in order to find it admissible. Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Rome Statute]. For a scholarly analysis of the Rome Statute’s gravity requirement,
see generally Susana SáCouto & Katherine Cleary, The Gravity Threshold of the
International Criminal Court, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 807 (2008).
40 See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ¶ 412 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001). There the court held that “multiple
criminal convictions entered under different statutory provisions but based on the
same conduct are permissible only if each statutory provision involved has a
materially distinct element not contained in the other. An element is materially
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They must justify the choice to use a novel crime instead of relying
on an established crime. This is done using a version of the sameelements test, which requires prosecutors to show that each crime
contains an element not contained in the other.41 Some overlap of
elements is permissible, but complete overlap is not. Similarly, one
crime may not be subsumed within another.42
In the end, I argue that the harms-based approach requires
prosecutors to do three things. First, they must identify with some
precision the harms associated with the allegedly criminal conduct.
Second, they must show that these harms are similar in type and
magnitude to harms associated with established crimes. Third, they
must show that the new crime is different enough from the
established crime to justify using the novel crime.
a. The Doctrinal Roots of a Harms-Based Approach
The law has always struggled to keep up with events. Legal
institutions—both juridical entities and the rules they apply—are
inherently conservative; they move slowly, relying on precedent,
and change incrementally. International criminal law, and other
areas of international law such as humanitarian law and human
rights law, have had to change quickly in response to atrocities.
Genocide was recognized as a crime because of the horrors of the
Holocaust.43 The conceptual foundations for the criminalization of
the underlying actions had been constructed long before, to be

distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact not required by the other.” Id. In
a later case, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶
168, 51 n.226 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), the ICTY
wrote that the test articulated in Delalic came from Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), which held that conviction for two offenses based on the
same underlying conduct depended on “whether each provision requires proof of
an additional fact which the other does not.”
41
See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (requiring
determination as to “whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not”).
42
Although a full exploration of the nuances of these issues is beyond the
scope of this Article, the principle of ne bis in idem, which “protects an individual
against double prosecution,” CARSTEN STAHN, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 247 (2019), is also implicated in the analysis. See id.
at 247-50 (analyzing parameters of the ne bis in idem principle in international
criminal prosecutions).
43
deGuzman, supra note 39, at 41.
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sure,44 but it took the atrocities of the second World War to galvanize
support for prosecution of the crime. 45 During the genocide in
Rwanda, there were hundreds of thousands of rapes committed
alongside the 500,000 to 1,000,000 killings.46 The rapes were carried
out, at least in part, because doing so caused specific harms that
were not caused by killing or any of the other atrocities committed.
For example, researchers who studied the victimized population
after the genocide found that even after the violence was over, “the
terrible social stigma that accompanies rape” continued to affect
survivors.47 Researchers even found that rape was used because it
inflicted this stigma.48 Many survivors were ostracized, treated as if
they were unfit for marriage, and struggled to raise their children.49
But when prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda were putting together the cases that they would bring, they
did not initially include rape among the charges.50 Rape as genocide
was charged only after a witness “spontaneously” testified in court
that she had been raped. 51 After the witness’s testimony, the
44 See Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, 41 AM. J.
INT’L L. 145, 146 (1947) (describing his proposal, submitted in 1933, to “declare the
destruction of racial, religious or social collectivities a crime under the law of
nations”).
45
deGuzman, supra note 39, at 19-20, 41.
46 See, e.g., Peter Landesman, A Woman’s Work, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 15, 2002,
at 82 (describing organization and execution of campaign of mass rapes during
genocide).
47 See Lisa Sharlach, Rape as Genocide: Bangladesh, the Former Yugoslavia, and
Rwanda, 22 NEW POL. SCI. 91, 99 (2000).
48 See id. at 98-99 (summarizing evidence of the incidence of rape in Rwanda
and concluding that those responsible for the genocide “used rape of women,
primarily Tutsi, as a political weapon”).
49 See Binaifer Nowrojee, Making the Invisible War Crime Visible: Post-Conflict
Justice for Sierra Leone’s Rape Victims, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 85, 104 (2005) (describing
the “particular stigma and shame that attaches to rape”); CHISECHE SALOME
MIBENGE, SEX AND INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: THE ERASURE OF GENDER FROM THE
WAR NARRATIVE 42, 46-47 (Bert B. Lockwood, Jr. ed., 2013) (describing the personal
and social stigma attached to rape).
50
See BINAIFER NOWROJEE, “YOUR JUSTICE IS TOO SLOW:” WILL THE ICTR FAIL
RWANDA’S RAPE VICTIMS? 8-9 (2005) (describing ICTY prosecutor’s failures to
develop a strategy to prosecute crimes of sexual violence and their failure to bring
such charges). See also, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,
¶ 417 (Sept. 2, 1998) (describing procedural history of amendment of the indictment
after testimony about sexual violence).
51
Kelly Dawn Askin, Gender Crimes Jurisprudence in the ICTR: Positive
Developments, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1007, 1009-10 (2005) (describing a witness who
testified that she had been raped and had heard of other rapes, and prosecutor’s
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prosecutors amended several indictments to include rape charges
against the defendants. What these examples demonstrate is that
the law has developed mechanisms by which to accommodate novel
crimes into existing categories.
The most instructive recent example comes from the Brima case
in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, discussed in detail above, in
which prosecutors charged the leaders of one of the armed factions
with the crime of forced marriage.52 During the wars in West Africa,
fighters from all of the combatant groups abused and committed
atrocities against women and girls. 53 Prosecutors developed
significant evidence of crimes that fit into existing categories, such
as rape and other sexual violence, kidnapping, and forced labor.54
Prosecutors could have charged these crimes within existing legal
categories of crimes against humanity.55 Instead, prosecutors chose
to charge Brima and his co-defendants with the novel crime of
“forced marriage,” as a crime against humanity.56 Prosecutors did
this not because they could not have proven the other crimes but
because they were convinced by survivors and advocates that the
harms associated with forced marriage were different from the
harms associated with the other crimes.57
subsequent amendment of the indictment to include rape charge); see Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 416 (Sept. 2, 1998) (noting that the
testimony about sexual violence was unexpected).
52 See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Indictment, ¶¶ 51-57
(May 13, 2004) (indicting defendants for the crime against humanity of “other
inhumane acts,” including “forced marriage”).
53 See generally LOUISE TAYLOR, HUM. RTS. WATCH, “WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU
CRY”: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT (2003),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sierleon0103.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K7KY-VA83] (describing, based on interviews with survivors
and witnesses, sexual violence against women and girls in Sierra Leone during the
conflict).
54 See generally Michelle Staggs Kelsall & Shanee Stepakoff, ‘When We Wanted
to Talk about Rape’: Silencing Sexual Violence at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 1 INT’L
J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 355 (2007) (describing extent of sexual violence in conflict in
Sierra Leone and experiences of survivors who were prepared to testify about it).
55
See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone arts. 2-4, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S.
145,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%202178/v2178.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G2B3-ZXJ8].
56
Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Indictment, ¶¶ 51-57 (May
13, 2004).
57 See Micaela Frulli, Advancing Criminal Law: The Special Court for Sierra Leone
Recognizes Forced Marriage as a “New” Crime Against Humanity 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
1033, 1035-36 (2008) (describing justifications for the creation of a new crime).
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To this point I have argued that within international criminal
law there is doctrinal space to account for harms that are not yet fully
recognized. In this Part, I show how this observation might be
applied to existing or emerging crimes. I use two examples to
demonstrate the point. The first is in the crime of pillage. To date,
prosecutors have typically charged pillage using what I have called
an episodic theory of pillage. With a more robust understanding of
a harms-based approach, prosecutors could charge pillage using
systematic theory that would account for many more harms and
significantly more wrongful conduct. Finally, a harms-based
approach might be useful to those who advocate using international
criminal law to address climate change. Wrongdoing that causes
harms to the environment or to non-human species can be difficult,
though not impossible, to fit into existing categories.
After showing how a harms-based approach might be used, I
address some possible objections or complications. First, one of the
problems with traditional approaches to defining crimes is that
definitional formulae that rely on notions of harm, or of
offensiveness to all mankind, often omit from consideration harms
that are felt mostly by women and girls. The idea that seemingly
neutral principles—that some acts are so evil that they must be
punished—could be distorted by social practices or cultural norms
is not itself extraordinary, but its effect on international criminal law
has been significant. Done clumsily, a harms-based approach might
exacerbate, or at least not remediate, this problem. Second, the
harms-based approach focuses on the subjective experiences of
victims. This creates a risk of moving international criminal law
even further away from a system of criminal law, with strict
protections for the rights of defendants, and closer to a system for
the vindication of the interests of victims. Third, I consider whether
the only doctrinal space for new crimes, at least those defined in
large part by a harms-based approach, is as the crime against
humanity of “other inhumane acts.” Finally, I consider how this
approach might be limited. Most important as limiting principles
will be the familiar requirements that criminal charges must not
violate the legality principle or other principles of due process.
Although the Trial Chamber initially rejected the prosecutor’s
attempts to convict Brima of forced marriage, the Appeals Chamber
found that forced marriage, as defined and proven by the
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prosecution, constituted a crime against humanity.58 To reach its
conclusion, the Appeals Chamber carefully considered the harms
associated with each of the similar crimes, which the defendants
argued rendered the crime of forced marriage inappropriate.59 The
Appeals Chamber found that forced marriage shared many
characteristics with crimes such as sexual slavery, but that it also had
distinct harms. Both involved forced sex and deprived the victim of
her liberty. But forced marriage also included “a forced conjugal
association” that resulted in “great suffering, or serious physical or
mental injury” to the victim.60 In addition, the Appeals Chamber
found that forced marriage “implies a relationship of exclusivity”
between the perpetrator and his purported wife, with the “wife”
risking “disciplinary consequences for a breach of this exclusive
arrangement.”61
Brima is useful for another reason: how prosecutors went about
making their case. When prosecutors decided to charge the crime
against humanity of forced marriage, they fitted it into an existing
doctrinal category. They argued, and ultimately proved, that forced
marriage was sufficiently different from other crimes and that its
existence was justified and supported by the evidence. They also
showed that it was sufficiently different from existing crimes insofar
as addressing harms that were not addressed by other crimes. No
existing crime addressed the harms that stemmed from a “forced
conjugal association” or having to act as the “wife” of your captor.
This balance of associating a new crime with an existing category
while arguing for its distinctiveness could operate as a guide for
others seeking to recognize new harms and new crimes.

58
Despite finding that the charged conduct satisfied the elements of the crime
against humanity of other inhumane acts, the Appeals Chamber ultimately decided
not to enter convictions for the crime. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-200416-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 202-03 (Feb. 22, 2008). The Appeals Chamber determined that
its decision to recognize that “such conduct is criminal and that it constitutes an
‘Other Inhumane Act’ capable of incurring individual criminal responsibility in
international law” was sufficient, and that entering cumulative convictions was not
warranted. Id. ¶ 202.
59 See id. ¶¶ 187-96.
60 See id. ¶ 195.
61
See id.
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b. A Harms-Based Approach is Consistent with the History and
Structure of the Law
The objective of this Article is to argue that international criminal
law has the doctrinal space to accommodate more harms and to
show how this might operate. This is not uncontroversial. In this
Part, I argue that this approach should be appealing—or at least not
objectionable—to scholars and advocates with varying theoretical
approaches to the law. An explicitly harms-based approach would
accomplish several goals that should be of interest to scholars and
advocates of various stripes.
First, expressivists should find amenable the ways this approach
accounts for separate, unique harms that are not captured by other
crimes with similar elements. To the extent that increasing
accountability for harms is a goal of international criminal law, this
approach should help do so. This should appeal to expressivists
who argue that policymakers can, under appropriate conditions,
deliberately harness the potential of the law to reduce undesirable
behaviors and to change the attitudes that support those behaviors.62
Expressivists argue that the “law provides information; information
changes beliefs; new beliefs change behavior.” 63 In international
criminal law this might occur through the decisions prosecutors and
courts make regarding which cases to take and which to ignore.64 It
might take place through sentencing or reparations decisions.65 By
directly accounting for harms that are not addressed elsewhere in
the law, international criminal law can send more accurate and
morally-defensible signals.66 It can show that all harms matter, not
62
For a thorough account of the expressive potential of the law, see generally
RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS (2015)
(analyzing the ways that expressivist approaches to law and law enforcement can
affect behavior).
63 Id. at 136 (emphasis omitted).
64 See, e.g., Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection
at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 268-71 (2012) (arguing that
case selection can have powerful signaling effects regarding the situations and
behaviors that are worthy of condemnation).
65 See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Reparative Justice after the Lubanga Appeal Judgment,
13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 801, 809-11 (2015) (arguing that reparations decisions can
reveal to victims and others the relative importance of particular crimes).
66
To be sure, the expressive potential of the law is more likely to have the
desired effect under particular circumstances. See MCADAMS, supra note 62, at 17679. One of these conditions is that the audience must be able to understand and
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just those affecting powerful or favored groups. It can also harness
the opprobrium that comes from prosecution and demonstrate that
it can be used to protect all groups and peoples, not just those with
power.67
Consider again the cases from Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Those
cases made more visible the kind of harms that often affect women
and girls and that have been given too little attention for too long.68
These cases were noteworthy not just because they brought the idea
of harm to the foreground of the definition of crimes.69 That had
happened before and had long been a part of international criminal
law.70 It was also significant to recognize what kinds of harms were
important, and who the most common victims of those harms have
been.71 The Rwanda cases can be seen as a before and after moment
in the law. Prosecutors initially brought those cases in the same way
that many prosecutors had brought cases in the past: by giving
infer the meaning associated with the legal action. Id. at 179. In the context of
international criminal prosecutions, this condition is likely to be met, particularly
with respect to novel crimes that owe their existence to victim pressure.
67
Separate but related to this point is the way that a harms-based approach
would attach the appropriate label to wrongdoing. It comports with what Darryl
Robinson calls the principle of fair labeling. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 927
(arguing that the label attached to the offense should express the wrongdoing
inherent in the act and signal disapproval of the harms the offense causes).
68 See, e.g., KATHY L. GACA, Girls, Women, and the Significance of Sexual Violence
in Ancient Warfare, in SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT ZONES: FROM THE ANCIENT
WORLD TO THE ERA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 73, 87 (Elizabeth D. Heineman ed., 2011)
(arguing that “the violent subjugation of women and girls through sexual assault
and torment has been an integral and important part of Western warfare over the
two millennia from the Bronze Age to late antiquity”).
69
See TUBA INAL, LOOTING AND RAPE IN WARTIME: LAW AND CHANGE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 59-60 (2013) (arguing that sexual violence during armed
conflict was viewed as unavoidable and mostly as a harm against the community,
thereby dismissing the experiences of individual women and girls who experienced
such assaults).
70 See, e.g., STAHN, supra note 42, at 85-87 (analyzing the law of pillage, which
protects property during times of armed conflict). Indeed, such prohibitions have
been present in legal systems since before the advent of international criminal law
as a discipline. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY 242-49
(2001) (describing history of prohibitions of particular conduct in armed conflict in
antiquity).
71 See Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in the Decisions and Indictments of the
Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 97, 99 (1999)
(arguing that modern international criminal tribunals have begun to “surmount[]
reluctance and other obstacles to address” crimes of sexual violence “despite their
sexually graphic nature and traditional insensitivities to women’s rights and
needs,” in contrast to the “history of impunity” for such crimes in previous
tribunals).
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insufficient attention to the harms that affect women and girls.
According to media reports and later evidence, there was a
campaign of mass rapes that affected as many as 500,000 women and
girls in Rwanda during the genocide. 72 But prosecutors did not
initially charge rape as a mode of genocide. It was only after
survivors and their advocates brought attention to the underlying
harms, and to prosecutors’ failure to address those harms, that the
law was used.73 In Sierra Leone, there were thousands of women
and girls affected by the phenomenon of forced marriage and
prosecutors (again prompted by survivors and their advocates, to be
sure) used the law to account for these harms. The result has been a
broadening of the kinds of harms that international criminal law will
consider sufficient to warrant legal recognition. 74 Harms to
traditionally vulnerable or politically disfavored groups—in both
cases, women and girls—were enough to change prosecutorial
strategy and to justify convictions for novel crimes.
Second, the approach considers and gives weight to harms not
previously countenanced by international criminal law. For much
of history the law did little to address the harms that are felt by
women and girls during times of armed conflict or widespread
unrest.75 Expanding the definition of crimes to include these harms
has been a salutary development. It can also be the impetus to
consider harms that are visited upon other groups or entities. For
72
For a thorough account of the many harms experienced by survivors of
sexual assault in Rwanda during the genocide, see generally Binaifer Nowrojee,
Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath, HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(1996),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/1996_Rwanda_%20Shattered
%20Lives.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8LE-JJR9] (describing, based on interviews with
survivors, the consequences of sexual violence during the genocide in Rwanda).
73 See Beth Van Schaak, Obstacles on the Road to Gender Justice: The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as Object Lesson, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
361, 369-75 (2009) (describing the ways that prosecutors amended indictments and
otherwise added charges regarding sexual violence in response to supposedly
unsolicited testimony of survivors).
74
For an analysis of the lingering harms associated with sexual violence in
Sierra Leone, see generally Binaifer Nowrojee, Making the Invisible War Crime Visible:
Post-Conflict Justice for Sierra Leone’s Rape Victims, 18 HARV. HUM RTS. J. 85 (2005)
(describing the harms experience by sexual violence survivors and the legal and
non-legal attempts to address those harms).
75
For example, Tuba Inal, in LOOTING AND RAPE IN WARTIME: LAW AND
CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, traces the long history of the prohibition of
pillage—theft during wartime—that began well before modern international
criminal tribunals began work. INAL, supra note 69, at 28-58. In contrast, Inal shows
that prohibitions against rape or other sexual violence during wartime were much
weaker and were omitted from important legal instruments. Id. at 59-91.
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example, the harms felt by communities when their natural
resources are illegally stolen might help support a more aggressive
approach to the crime of pillage. 76 Alternatively, environmental
harms that are inflicted upon non-human species would become
more important and might support a stronger approach to
This should appeal to many
prosecution in that area. 77
constructivist scholars because it explicitly addresses harms to the
community. Constructivist scholars argue that most institutions
and individuals are motivated by ideas or concepts, not merely
material considerations.78 These beliefs or concepts help to create
interests, which can then be led to actions.79 When there are tears to
the fabric of a community that must be mended to permit the
community to heal, international criminal law is often posited as a
partial means by which this can happen. 80 To the extent that
scholars and advocates argue that international criminal law can
play an important role in post-conflict reconstruction, particularly
reconstruction of the community’s norms and relationships, then an
approach to criminalization that directly attends to harms should be
welcome.81
Third, because a harms-based approach would include harms to
previously-disfavored groups or to entities like the environment, it

76 See Patrick J. Keenan, Conflict Minerals and the Law of Pillage, 14 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 524, 544-47 (2014) (arguing that the law of pillage has the potential to address
widespread community-level harms).
77 See generally Linda A. Malone & Scott Pasternack, Exercising Environmental
Human Rights and Remedies in the United Nations System, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y REV. 365 (2002) (analyzing the ways that claimants might seek redress for
harms to the environment and describing the enforcement difficulties that might
arise). See also Shirley V. Scott, Patrick J. Keenan & Charlotte Ku, The Creation of a
Climate Change Court or Tribunal, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL 66, 69-74 (Shirley V. Scott & Charlotte Ku, eds., 2018) (arguing that
international criminal law has the doctrinal space to permit prosecution of climaterelated harms, albeit with some difficulty).
78
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, Taking Stock: The Constructivist
Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics, 4 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 2001 391, 393 (2001).
79 Id.
80
For a discussion of the ways that international criminal law can and cannot
contribute to transitional justice, see generally Peter Dixon & Chris Tenove,
International Criminal Justice as a Transnational Field: Rules, Authority and Victims, 7
INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 393 (2013).
81 See generally Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 69 (2003) (analyzing the ways that various forms of juridical institutions and legal
responses to atrocities and repression can contribute to social healing).
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should appeal to rational choice scholars.82 Rational choice scholars
argue that individuals act so as to maximize their utility.83 At its
most basic level, this means that when individuals decide whether
or not to comply with the law, they make a calculation involving the
likelihood that they will be caught and the consequences they will
suffer if they are caught. 84 For too long, this calculation was
distorted because, for example, the legal consequences of
committing crimes against women and girls in times of conflict were
weak, and the likelihood of prosecution was small. Similarly,
because harms to the environment, communities, or to non-human
species were not likely to lead to prosecution and punishment, likely
wrongdoers did not face the full costs of their actions.
Finally, a benefit of a harms-based approach is that it would
better comport with what some scholars have called the “fair
labeling principle.” 85 Darryl Robinson has described this as the
requirement that “the label of the offence should fairly express and
signal the wrongdoing of the accused, so that the stigma of
conviction corresponds to the wrongfulness of the act.”86 Although
Robinson and other scholars have focused on fair labeling with
respect to modes of participation in a crime—for example,
accomplice liability versus commission 87 —the concept may be
applied more broadly. Defining crimes at least in part by the harms
experienced by victims goes a long way toward ensuring that the
label attached to the crime expresses the underlying harmful
conduct. To take an obvious example, in Sierra Leone it was
82
For a thorough exploration of the ways that a rational choice model can
explain international law, see ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW
WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008).
83 See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Introduction, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S1, S3 (2002) (“Rational choice is the general label for a variety of related
methodological approaches to the study of goal-directed behavior under
constraints of scarcity.”).
84
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 176 (1968) (“[A] person commits an offense if the expected utility to him
exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other
activities.”).
85
See, e.g., Elies van Sliedregt, The Curious Case of International Criminal
Liability, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1171, 1182-83 (2012) (describing the evolution of the
concept of fair labeling).
86
Robinson, supra note 1, at 927.
87 Id. at 927 n.9 (focusing on fair labeling as it pertains to “the difference
between two forms of participation”). See also van Sliedregt, supra note 85, at 1183
(arguing for the importance of fair labeling with respect to “criminal participation”
and the need to distinguish between principals and accessories).
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important to victims that their experience as so-called “bush wives”
be understood differently from other harms that they had suffered.
Thus, prosecutors sought convictions for forced marriage and
crimes of sexual violence. Conviction for these crimes accurately
signaled to all the full measure of the underlying wrongful conduct.
c. Limitations
There are several possible objections to the approach that I
propose. In this Part I address four problems: the potential for
subjectivity or abuse, the difficulty of addressing harms caused by
systems of exploitation or caused to non-human entities, the
possibility of further erosion of the legality principle and the
potential for the erosion of the rights of defendants, and the politics
of criminalization in the first place. None of these objections is
insurmountable, but a fair analysis of my approach requires that I
address them at least briefly.
i.

Subjectivity

First, any approach that focuses on harms is vulnerable to
manipulation or misuse. To see how this might be a problem,
consider an example from a case from the former Yugoslavia. When
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was
analyzing the meaning of “other inhuman acts,” it described its
approach as follows: “identify a set of basic rights appertaining to
human beings, the infringement of which may amount, depending
on the accompanying circumstances, to a crime against humanity.”88
It is possible that what prosecutors or others consider to be a basic
right is itself contingent on their initial assumptions or other factors.
This might well leave out disfavored groups; indeed, a version of
this may be responsible for why harms that principally affect
women and girls were taken less seriously than others for too long.
Thus, it is important that I acknowledge that my approach might be
subject to abuse.

88
Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-96-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 566 (Int’l. Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000). To be sure, the court did not conclude
that these were the sole considerations.
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Systemic Causes and Effects

Second, this approach can omit the harms that are caused by
systems of abuse, like those that come from systematic pillage. It
may well be appropriate to treat the harms to a community as
different from harms to individuals. This approach leaves out
harms to non-human species. Degrading treatment to animals or
the environment can be as harmful as anything done to humans, but
it is important to acknowledge that this assertion is contested.
iii. The Legality Principle
A third possible objection centers on the requirements that
international criminal law comply with the legality principle and
that charges be sufficiently specific to comport with basic norms of
due process and human rights. A harms-based approach could
become, at its core, a victim-centered teleological interpretive rule.89
As argued most powerfully by Darryl Robinson, international
criminal law risks losing its character as an authoritative system of
criminal law when it deviates from due process norms. 90 To the
extent that courts continue to conclude that the object and purpose
of all statutes or rules is to give victims as much protection as
possible, and end impunity and ensure accountability by making
conviction more likely, the regime is at odds with the strict due
process application that should be part of any criminal law regime.91
Finally, the rigor with which courts apply the legality principle is
already underwhelming.
One of the most compelling arguments in favor of the creation
of the International Criminal Court and the development of
international criminal law has been the potential to end impunity for
those who perpetrate atrocities. 92 Scholars have argued that the
89 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.”).
90
Robinson, supra note 1.
91
Id. at 935-36.
92
For example, the Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court notes that one of the justifications for the creation of the International
Criminal Court is that states were determined “to put an end to impunity for the
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need to end impunity is a compelling justification for the
International Criminal Court’s actions (or a valid basis for criticizing
its inaction).93 It is certainly true that ending impunity is a laudable
goal. But, the doctrinal consequences of this goal have contributed
to some of the problems that a harms-based approach might help
solve.94
In addition to the creation and justification of the International
Criminal Court, the goal of ending impunity has been advanced to
justify relaxing the legality principle and allowing for easier
prosecution on novel theories. Although my approach does not
directly implicate this issue, it is helpful to note that concerns about
the legality principle may, at times, be less significant than they first
appear. The legality principle exists, at least in part, to protect two
core underlying values. The first is that defendants must have notice
of the conduct for which they are to be held criminally liable.
Convicting and punishing a defendant for conduct that was not
defined as criminal at the time it was committed violates
fundamental notions of due process.95 Second, and closely related,
is that violations of due process run the risk of undermining the
legitimacy of the proceedings. These considerations are surely
important, but there are distinctive features of international criminal
law that may make them less salient than they would be in the
domestic context.
perpetrators” of serious international crimes. Rome Statute, supra note 39, pmbl.
See also Christopher Keith Hall, The Powers and Role of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court in the Global Fight Against Impunity, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
121, 121-24 (2004) (arguing that one of the primary purposes of the International
Criminal Court is to fight impunity, and that the structure and performance of the
Office of the Prosecutor can determine whether the International Criminal Court
can fulfill its mission).
93 See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice
Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 9-13 (2001) (describing the importance
of ending impunity and the consequences of impunity on deterrence and
prevention of serious international crimes). Other scholars have criticized the
International Criminal Court for its failure to do more to end impunity. See generally
Dawn L. Rothe & Victoria E. Collins, The International Criminal Court: A Pipe Dream
to End Impunity?, 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 191 (2013) (arguing that structural problems
with the International Criminal Court have prevented it from fulfilling its purpose
of ending impunity).
94
See SáCouto, Sadat & Sellers, supra note 13, at 241 (arguing that “highly
restrictive jurisprudence” has made it difficult for prosecutors to win cases and
thereby end impunity for grave crimes).
95 See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 4, at 121 (arguing that one of the primary
justifications for the legality principle is “ensuring that individuals are capable of
obtaining notice of prescribed conduct so they can rationally adjust their behavior
to avoid sanction”).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss2/2

2020]

Doctrinal Innovation in International Criminal Law

431

With respect to the notice issue, it is true that defendants might
not have been on notice of the particular configuration of elements
for which prosecutors seek a conviction. But international criminal
law is only available and only prosecutes the most heinous crimes.
International criminal law does not address minor crimes or
technical violations of obscure rules. Instead, international criminal
tribunals address only very serious atrocities which are recognized
as wrongful in legal systems around the world. To be sure, the
legality principle should be taken seriously, and it protects
important values. But allowing international criminal law to
accommodate novel harms is unlikely to result in the conviction of
defendants who had no idea that their conduct was wrongful when
it was committed. With respect to the legitimacy question, the
legality principle works less directly. The legitimacy of an
institution, and any individual prosecution, is largely a political
issue. If the relevant stakeholders accept the legitimacy of the
institution, even if it does allow for the prosecution of novel crimes,
the legality principle’s underlying considerations are satisfied.
A related issue with a harms-based approach is that it might be
difficult for a defendant to argue in a principled way against the
assertion that his or her conduct produced specific harms. If a victim
testifies that the defendant’s conduct harmed her in a particular
way, there is no real evidence that a defendant could produce to
refute that assertion. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine how a
defendant could argue, for example, that the harms associated with
forced marriage are not similar to those caused by established
categories of sexual violence. What is more, doing so would involve
denying the validity of the victim’s subjective experience and
alienating the court.
International criminal law is inevitably and unavoidably
political. It is naïve to argue that it exists outside of politics.
Decisions such as what harms are sufficiently important to justify a
prosecution, and which are not, are themselves political choices.
They take place within the constraints of the law, but choosing who
counts and who does not is politics. To the extent that international
criminal law exists, and is applied, to promote accountability, a
harms-based approach is appropriate. Related to this is the perhaps
obvious truth that interpretation of the law is not a scientific
endeavor. Statutes and rules can be applied in many ways, and a
victim-centered approach is the most appropriate choice.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

432

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:2

iv. The Politics of Criminalization
The issue of whether particular conduct warrants criminal
punishment is a complex and important question, whether it arises
in a single state or in a juridical institution created by many states. 96
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a full theory of how
and why certain acts are criminalized. But, before moving on, it is
important to consider at least some of the competing theories of how
conduct is criminalized to understand how new crimes might be
created or justified.
Determining how a single state should decide whether to use the
coercive authority of the state to punish people who engage in
specified conduct goes to the core of state power.97 Most scholarly
analyses of these issues focus on the legal-philosophical questions
that underlie the legitimate justifications for the state to prosecute
and punish wrongdoers.98 There has been comparatively little work
on this issue in international criminal law,99 but the substantial work
on the issue in domestic criminal law is instructive. Some scholars
argue that the only appropriate function of the criminal law is the
“the achievement of retributive justice.”100 By this they mean that
punishing wrongdoers as much as they deserve to be punished is
the only legitimate justification for the state to use its coercive power
in this way. On this account, the goal of defining crimes is, in part,
to help determine which conduct justifies the imposition of
punishment. Other scholars argue that deterrence is the appropriate
justification for the use of criminal punishment.101 These scholars
96
See Alejandro Chehtman, A Theory of International Crimes: Conceptual and
Normative Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (K.J.
Heller
et
al.
eds.,
forthcoming
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3082869
[https://perma.cc/G82S-F4LD].
97 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Longmans, 2011) (1859).
98
See generally, MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 84 (1997) (analyzing the “prima facie reasons given to justify the
institution of punishment”).
99
For a theoretical account of the arguments for and against desert-based
theories of international criminal law, see Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments &
International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert, 52 VA J. INT’L L. 633, 638 (2012) (arguing
that an international criminal law response is not “retributive to its core”, but is
“justified by the view that desert serves the many policy goals of the” response).
100
See MOORE, supra note 98, at 78-79.
101
See generally, Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in
the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J.
949 (2003).
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maintain that punishment is justified for those who violate the law
at least partly because of the effect this punishment will have on
other people who may be considering whether to break the law.
Finally, some scholars argue that a primary justification for
prosecution and punishment is incapacitation.102 On this approach,
the state is justified to use its coercive power to take wrongdoers out
of society to prevent them from harming others.103
Debates about criminalization in international criminal law
implicate many of these issues, but criminalization inevitably raises
problems that are much messier than mere theoretical arguments.
Part of the reason is that each of the theoretical justifications of
punishments, at least as advanced by most scholars, amount to
attempts to identify the sole or primary reason to punish.104 Even if
such purity was possible in domestic legal systems, it is not
conceivable in an international system. In international criminal
law, the picture is much more complex. There are far more potential
wrongdoers than international institutions could ever punish. It is
unclear whether international institutions can have a deterrent
effect. Perhaps more importantly, international legal institutions are
created with so many purported objectives—not all of which may
even be compatible with each other—that they must balance
political considerations alongside theoretical and legal
considerations. Even having acknowledged that it is unavoidable
that criminalization in the international system will involve a wide
range of considerations, it is nonetheless useful to consider how
particular acts come to be defined as crimes.
Defining crimes in the international system has involved a backand-forth process implicating the traditional considerations of
malum in se and malum prohibitum.105 Some core international crimes
first faced prosecution not because they were the subject of specific,
well-known definitions but because the underlying conduct was
considered so evil that not prosecuting it was viewed as wrongful.106
102
For a discussion on the justification of incapacitation, see generally Paul H.
Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 NW. U. L. REV.
19, 22 n.15 (1987-1988).
103
See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Commentary, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 343 (1983) (recognizing that preventing harm to others by removing
offenders is a principal justification for criminal punishment).
104
See, e.g., Keenan, supra note 3, at 448-49.
105 See STAHN, supra note 42, at 19-22.
106 See generally David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J.
INT’L L. 85 (2004) (illustrating that crimes against humanity pose a universal threat
to humankind, which shares an interest in minimizing these crimes).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

434

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:2

For example, prosecution of crimes against humanity became
possible largely because scholars and advocates came to believe that
some acts were so heinous that they required prosecution, even if
the acts did not fit neatly into existing categories of crimes.107 This
approach to defining wrongful conduct covered a number of crimes
that are now well recognized. For example, pirates were considered
the enemies of all mankind.108 Because their acts were so evil, they
could be prosecuted by any state that caught them.109
Other scholars argue that the classical conception of sovereignty
means that crimes may be prosecuted only if states agree that they
should be punished.110 On this approach, the inherent wrongfulness
of an act is perhaps less important than whether the act has been
subject to individual criminal prosecution in enough states or the
subject of an international convention.
The reality of criminalization at the international level is an
amalgam of these theories (with a measure of politics mixed in as
well). Consider Raphael Lemkin’s arguments in favor of the
criminalization and prosecution of the crime of genocide. He
argued that “[i]f the destruction of human groups is a problem of
international concern, then such acts should be treated as crimes
under the law of nations, like piracy.”111 For Lemkin, this meant that
those alleged to have committed genocide should be prosecuted
“irrespective of the nationality of the offender and of the place
where the crime was committed.” 112 Lemkin was making an
argument about how the international legal system should address
crimes the effects of which were considered similarly harmful. If
genocide was as harmful as piracy, then it should be prosecuted as
piracy was prosecuted. This argument was an attempt to bridge the
107 See Robert H. Jackson, Representative & Chief of Counsel for the U.S.,
Opening Statement for the United States of America at the International Military
Tribunal N.1 at The Palace of Justice, Nuremberg , Germany 1 (Nov. 21, 1945),
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context
=imt [https://perma.cc/C9U5-DUBM] (“The wrongs which we seek to condemn
and punish have been so calculated, so malignant and so devastating, that
civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive their being
repeated.”).
108
See STAHN, supra note 42, at 19.
109
Id.
110
See e.g., Robert Cryer, International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another
Round?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L CRIM. L. 979, 985-87 (2005) (analyzing the connections
between state consent, sovereignty, and the reach of international criminal law).
111
Lemkin, supra note 44, at 146.
112 Id.
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theoretical gap between those who sought prosecution for
inherently evil acts, even if they had not yet been criminalized, and
those who would restrict prosecution to those acts that were defined
and accepted as crimes by a majority of states. This approach
grounded any expansion of international law in some consideration
of existing crimes. If its harms were not similar to existing crimes,
then it would be much more difficult to justify prosecuting the new
crime.
III. EXTENSIONS AND COMPLICATIONS
In this Part, I illustrate how a harms-based approach might be
productively deployed to address harms that are not currently fully
addressed in international criminal law. This Part is necessarily
speculative. My objective is to show that this approach has the
potential to affect real cases, not that it will be a winning argument
in every case. First, I show how it could bolster attempts to use
international criminal law to prosecute individuals for harms that
affect entire communities, such as the pillaging of conflict minerals.
Then, I argue that this approach could be used to address harms
associated with climate change.
a. Community-Based Harms
There are several possible applications of a harms-based theory
of criminalization. Before examining them in more detail, it is
important to note that these applications show how a harms-based
approach might inform both charging decisions and the definitions
of crimes. When prosecutors are faced with the complex bundle of
facts that can arise after an investigation into atrocities or a
prolonged period of conflict, they have several important problems
to solve. Two are particularly relevant here. The first is to identify
the legal categories into which they can fit the wrongful conduct
they have identified. This is a problem of identifying the
appropriate crimes and sorting the wrongful conduct accordingly.
Part of my argument is the catalog of available categories has been,
and should further be, expanded based on a consideration of the
harms caused by the wrongful conduct. This is, for example, how
the crime of forced marriage came into existence. Another part of
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my argument is that prosecutors can, and should, use existing
categories more creatively when they make charging decisions. This
is an issue of prosecutorial discretion: when faced with a surplus of
evidence of wrongdoing, and constrained by scarce resources and
time, which crimes should be charged?
The examples I examine in this Part address both of these issues.
I first consider the law of pillage, an increasingly common
phenomenon in armed conflict. I argue that prosecutors should use
their existing charging discretion differently to account for harms
that are currently not covered in typical cases.113 There are harms to
the community that are not addressed when prosecutors focus only
on discrete episodes of pillage and fail to address the systematic
pillage of natural resources. I next consider environmental harms
and the potential to use international criminal law to address the
harms associated with climate change.114 Here, I argue that there are
harms to non-human species and to ecosystems that are not covered
by existing categories.
In many modern conflicts, it is common for one or more of the
combatant groups to exploit natural resources to enrich itself, pay
for the war, or enrich its allies.115 The prosecutorial strategy most
commonly used is viewed as unsatisfactory by many scholars and
advocates who have considered it. Part of the reason that the legal
strategy is inadequate is that it does not adequately address all of
the underlying harms caused by the exploitive behavior. 116
113
In an earlier Article I covered this issue in much more detail and I draw on
that work here. See generally Keenan, supra note 76 (analyzing the law of pillage and
arguing for a systemic theory of pillage to permit the prosecution of a broader range
of harms).
114
In making these arguments, I rely on Patrick J. Keenan, International
Criminal Law and Climate Change, 37 B.U. INT’L L.J. 89 (2019), in which I argued that
international criminal law could, under appropriate and limited conditions,
contribute to the fight against climate change.
115 See, e.g., Jean D’Aspremont, Towards an International Law of Brigandage:
Interpretative Engineering for the Regulation of Natural Resources Exploitation, 3 ASIAN
J. INT’L L. 1, 3-8 (2013) (noting that the humanitarian law prohibition on pillage has
been the principal legal mechanism used to address resource exploitation and
arguing that it has been inadequate to this point); Ruben Carranza, Plunder and Pain:
Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic Crimes? 2 INT’L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 310, 329 (2008) (arguing that transitional justice mechanisms,
including criminal prosecutions, should address economic exploitation during
conflict to avoid creating an “impunity gap” that can arise when prosecutors ignore
“large-scale corruption and economic crimes”).
116 See, e.g., Larissa van den Herik & Daniëlla Dam-De Jong, Revitalizing the
Antique War Crime of Pillage: The Potential and Pitfalls of Using International Criminal
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Prosecutions using a harms-based strategy would approach the
problem differently. Instead of focusing exclusively on discrete,
small-scale episodes of pillage, they would address larger-scale
systems of exploitation that cause the most harm to the most people.
The crime of pillage is the charge most often used by prosecutors
to address this kind of exploitation. In modern international
criminal law, the crime of pillage occurs when someone
appropriates property during a conflict with the intent to deprive
the owner of the property and to put the property to private or
personal use. 117 There are, of course, other tools available to
prosecutors seeking to hold individuals accountable for this
exploitation, but the crime of pillage is most commonly used.118 This
approach is consistent with modern international criminal law, but
does not adequately address the underlying harms caused by much
of the exploitation seen in modern conflicts. Prosecutors often adopt
what I have called elsewhere the “episodic theory of pillage.” 119
When they used the episodic approach to prosecuting pillage,
prosecutors focused on discrete, often small-scale episodes of theft
during armed conflict.120 Consider two examples.
In Prosecutor v. Brima from the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the
defendants were convicted of the war crime of pillage. 121 The

Law to Address Illegal Resource Exploitation During Armed Conflict, 15 CRIM. L.F. 237,
272-73 (2011) (arguing that the crime of pillage, as currently deployed by
prosecutors, has limited utility as a way to address the harms of resource
exploitation during armed conflict).
117
See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 185 (2005) (describing the prohibition on
pillage as the prohibition of theft during wartime).
118 See van den Herik & Dam-De Jong, supra note 116, at 272-73 (describing
shortcomings of the current law of pillage).
119
See Keenan, supra note 76, at 534.
120
For a complete inventory of every case involving pillage, see JAMES G.
STEWART, CORPORATE WAR CRIMES: PROSECUTING THE PILLAGE OF NATURAL
RESOURCES 95-124 (2011). Stewart catalogues every decision on pillage from an
international criminal tribunal and many from domestic courts that were based on
incidents that occurred during a conflict.
121 See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 2113, 17,
21 (June 20, 2007). In the Special Court for Sierra Leone, only those defendants who
bore the most responsibility for the violence in Sierra Leone were tried. See Sierra
Leone Agreement, supra note 23, art. 1(1) (providing that the Special Court shall
have the power “to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for
serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law”).
This resulted in a total of four major cases, one against each of the three principal
warring factions, plus one against former Liberian president Charles Taylor.
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convictions 122 were based on the theft during armed conflict of
“palm wine,”123 “televisions, radios and other goods,”124 and a “gold
plated wrist watch.”125 In a separate case, the pillage counts alleged
the theft of similar goods and more substantial goods such as a
“baling machine and some . . . furniture,”126 and “bags of money.”127
In Prosecutor v. Blaskic,128 from the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, the defendants were charged with
stealing “civilian personal property and livestock.”129 Cases like this
are important because they recognize and address harms felt by
individual victims and their survivors. But they also involve
discrete objects or products that were not part of a larger system of
exploitation, even if they were surely useful to those who stole them.
What is more, these discrete episodes of pillage are different
from the large-scale exploitation of natural resources because there
is not a clear connection between the appropriation and the conflict.
There is little evidence that the theft of palm wine, radios, or
televisions sustained the wars in West Africa in a substantial way.
Instead, the acts of pillage supported the fighting, but did not appear
to fuel it. For example, in Delalic and other cases from the former
Yugoslavia, the stolen property was a form of supplement to the
wages of individual fighters.130 It was not an important component
of a broader scheme to pay for the war or the underlying motivation
for the fighting.131 In Brima, from Sierra Leone, the picture is a bit
122
Because there were only four major cases, each case included wide-ranging
factual allegations against multiple defendants. In Brima, the allegations
underlying the pillage count spanned five separate geographic areas and occurred
over approximately twenty months. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16T, Judgement, ¶ 1395 (June 20, 2007). The factual allegations noted above are
representative of those in the case.
123 Id. ¶ 1413.
124 Id. ¶ 1426.
125 Id.
126 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Judgement, ¶ 1894 (May 18,
2012).
127
Id. ¶ 1890.
128
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Second Amended Indictment
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia April 25, 1997).
129 Id. ¶ 6.3.
130 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 1151-1154
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) (finding that items stolen
from prisoners were not of sufficient value to satisfy legal requirements).
131 See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 1154 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia March 3, 2000) (describing items stolen by
defendant).
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cloudier, but still supports the argument. There, the fighters
engaged in theft as part of a plan to support themselves while they
were fighting. Indeed, one episode the prosecutors focused on was
part of a scheme called “Operation Pay Yourself” by those
involved. 132 In that scheme, commanders granted lower-level
fighters permission to steal from civilians as a way to pay for their
own survival.133 The thefts principally benefitted those who did the
actual stealing, and did not provide the impetus for the armed
conflict.134
Contrast this with what I have called the systematic theory of
pillage.135 This approach would retain the same basic elements of
the crime, but give more weight to different harms, those that are
unaddressed by current prosecutions. With a systematic theory of
pillage, prosecutors could target broader harms, especially those
harms to a community. Pursuant to a systematic theory of pillage,
prosecutors would be required to prove that the defendant
controlled the instrumentality or system by which the defendant
appropriated the property. This could be done by showing that the
combatants under the defendant’s command controlled, for
example, a mine (or other resources). The acts of appropriation
might take place over a longer time period than the discrete episodes
and might involve more participants.
Most important for my purposes is that the harms are different
than those addressed with the episodic pillage cases. In typical,
episodic pillage cases, the harms are those associated with theft
cases. Victims are deprived of their property. They suffer the
violation that comes from having their homes, farms, or businesses
invaded by armed fighters seeking to steal from them. These are
important harms that the law rightly addresses. The harms
associated with the systemic pillage of natural resources are
different and are not covered by other charges. The harms are many.
Communities are permanently deprived of resources necessary to
132
See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 1398 (June
20, 2007); see also James Rupert, Diamond Hunters Fuel Africa’s Brutal Wars, WASH.
POST, Oct. 16, 1999, at A1 (reporting on the effects of “Operation Pay Yourself” on
the civilian population).
133
See Rupert, supra note 132.
134
For example, some of the vehicles commandeered and some of the money
stolen from banks apparently went to commanders rather than those who actually
stole the property. See Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶
782-786 (Mar. 2, 2009).
135 See generally Keenan, supra note 76 (arguing that the systemic approach to
the law of pillage could address more harms than the current approach).
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reach their economic potential or to fully develop. Community
members are forced to work on behalf of a system that is
impoverishing them, even if they are paid for their labor or
undertake the work voluntarily. Indeed, their labor is used in a way
that exacerbates long-term suffering and deprivation by prolonging
the conflict and making it more lethal. Charging pillage under a
systematic theory would address these harms.
Consider two examples to see how this might work. Former
Liberian president Charles Taylor was convicted of a range of crimes
by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for his role in the wars in West
Africa in the 1990s. Indeed, Taylor was convicted of pillage—based
on the actions of troops under his command—for “Operation Pay
Yourself.”136 But he was not charged with or convicted of pillage or
anything else for his role in systematically looting Sierra Leone’s
natural resources.137 There is substantial evidence that Taylor was
involved in the systematic pillaging of many natural resources in
Sierra Leone, including diamonds and timber, and that the proceeds
from these activities fueled the war.138 The community-based harms
caused by these acts were substantial and continued to affect the
victimized communities for years. 139 But the charges pursued by
prosecutors did not address these harms in any substantial way.140
The second example comes from the prosecution of Bosco
Ntanganda in the International Criminal Court. Ntaganda was
convicted in the International Criminal Court in July 2019 of a
number of crimes relating to his role in the wars in Eastern Congo.141
Importantly, he was not charged or convicted for his role in the
136 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 1878, 1963 (May
18, 2012); see also Rupert, supra note 132 (reporting on the effects of “Operation Pay
Yourself” on the civilian population).
137
Id. ¶ 6994.
138 See generally Ruben De Koning, Greed or Grievance in West Africa’s Forest
Wars?, in EXTREME CONFLICT AND TROPICAL FORESTS 37 (Wil De Jong, Deanna
Donovan & Ken-Ichi Abe eds., 2007).
139
For an analysis of the substantial losses to the communities caused by illicit
timber operations, see Rep. of the Panel of Experts on Liberia (2001), transmitted by
Letter dated 26 October 2001 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm.
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1343 (2001), Paragraph 19, Concerning Liberia
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶¶ 321-49, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/1015 (Oct. 26, 2001).
140 See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I, Amended Indictment
(Mar. 16, 2006). Taylor was charged with several specific instances of pillaging, but
not for the systematic exploitation of natural resources. Id. ¶¶ 28-31.
141 See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgment, at 53538 (July 8, 2019) (listing crimes for which Ntaganda had been convicted).
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exploitation of Congo’s natural resources.142 Ntaganda is an ethnic
Tutsi, born in Rwanda and raised in eastern Congo.143 He began his
career in the Rwandan Patriotic Army 144 and particpated in
displacing Mobutu Sese Seko and replacing him with Laurent
Kabila.145 After that, Ntaganda was involved in fighting in eastern
Congo, rising to become the chief of military operations in the
Congolese region of Ituri for one of the main rebel groups there.146
There, Ntaganda was involved in the forcible recruitment of child
soldiers, commanded troops that engaged in deadly campaigns of
mass rape, murder, and other international crimes.147 Eventually he
was charged in the International Criminal Court with the war crime
of pillage, among many other crimes. But the charges against him
did not include many of the most significant harms that flowed from
his activities: the systematic pillaging of natural resources that
helped fund the conflict.148 The harms to the community that came
from having non-renewable wealth stolen were not addressed but
could have been.
Before moving on, a short caveat is in order. I do not argue that
a harms-based approach would inevitably lead to more
prosecutions of the kind that I have identified. Instead, I argue that
there is room within existing law for such an approach, and that
doing so would be consistent with important principles of
international law. The law has long struggled with the recognition
that the human capacity to cause harm would always outstrip the
predictive powers of scholars and advocates. It is increasingly
difficult for the International Criminal Court to justify its track
142
See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Updated
Document Containing the Charges (Nov. 14, 2014). Ntaganda was charged with
pillaging for a number of discrete acts of theft by forces under his control. Id. ¶¶
67, 72, 77-78, 81, 84-85.
143
See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgment, ¶ 1
(July 8, 2019).
144 See DR Congo: Suspected War Criminal Wanted, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 29,
2008),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/29/dr-congo-suspected-warcriminal-wanted [https://perma.cc/2Q8Z-F8TZ].
145
See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgment, ¶¶ 5-8
(July 8, 2019) (describing Ntaganda’s role in early wars in Congo).
146
Id. ¶¶ 12-32 (describing Ntaganda’s role in later conflict in Congo).
147
See The Enough Project, Fact Sheet: Who is Bosco Ntaganda: Lynchpin to
Security
or
International
War
Criminal,
ENOUGH
(Apr.
2012),
https://enoughproject.org/files/BoscoNtaganda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VJEBS8L].
148 See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgment, at 53538 (July 8, 2019) (listing crimes for which Ntaganda had been convicted).
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record. Twenty years into its existence, the International Criminal
Court has not had the effect its most ambitious proponents would
have preferred. Indeed, the Office of the Prosecutor acknowledged
that it had not fully realized its potential in its Strategic Plan,
released in 2019.149 In it, the OTP set as goals the need to have a
higher success rate in court and to accomplish this in significant part
by the way it chooses and develops cases in their early stages.150 The
law has room to evolve to account for more harms, done to more
people, communities, and things, than it has so far fully recognized.
b. Harms to Non-Human Species and the Environment
A second potential application is in the area of environmental
crimes. Scholars and advocates have long sought plausible ways to
use criminal law, including international criminal law to address the
harms that come from climate change. One prominent scholar has
argued that causing harms to the environment should amount to an
international crime because doing so is a breach of an erga omnes
norm prohibiting actions that cause gross harm to the
environment.151 Another advocate has gone so far as to propose a
statute that would criminalize such conduct. 152 This proposal is
explicitly based on the argument that the harms associated with
deliberate environmental destruction are similar to the harms
associated with other core international crimes, both in scale and in
moral seriousness.153

149 See INT’L CRIM. CT., THE OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, STRATEGIC PLAN: 2019-2021
at 13-15 (July 17, 2019) (describing goal of increasing success rate in court).
150 Id. at 13-22.
151 See Mark Allan Gray, The International Crime of Ecocide, 26 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
215, 270 (1996).
152
See POLLY HIGGINS, ERADICATING ECOCIDE: LAWS AND GOVERNANCE TO
PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR PLANET 61-63 (2d ed. 2015).
153
Id. There is, of course, much more scholarship on this issue. See, e.g., Berat,
supra note 20, at 343-44; POLLY HIGGINS, ECOCIDE DIRECTIVE art. 1.1,
http://eradicatingecocide.com/the-law/ecocide-directive/
[https://perma.cc/R5ZX-QA9Z]; Polly Higgins, Damien Short & Nigel South,
Protecting the Planet: A Proposal for a Law of Ecocide, 59 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 251
(2013).
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These attempts have not born fruit, in part because of doctrinal
problems that a harms-based approach could help to solve.154 A
prosecutor attempting to pursue a case involving environmental
crimes would likely face an objection that the charges violated the
legality principle. This requires that the substantive activity be
defined as unlawful and that those who engaged in the activity be
subject to individual criminal prosecution. There is an increasing
number of cases demonstrating that activity that causes climate
harms is unlawful. 155 More difficult would be an attempt to
demonstrate that the underlying behavior was subject to individual
criminal prosecution. It is here that the harms-based approach, akin
to that taken in Brima, would be most useful. Consider a proposed
definition of such a crime, put forth by Lynn Berat:
[T]he intentional destruction, in whole or in part, of any
portion of the global ecosystem, via killing members of a
species; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the species; inflicting on the species conditions of life that
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; and
imposing measures that prevent births within the group or
lead to birth defects.156
As in Brima, the underlying actions are already subject to
individual criminal prosecution in many places. And, more
importantly, a harms-based approach would make harms to nonhuman species and the environment cognizable.
154
The Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court recently
released a policy paper on case selection that seems to recognize the importance of
this issue, which may signal a willingness to address it in cases. See Alessandra
Mistura, Is There Space for Environmental Crimes Under International Criminal Law?
The Impact of the Office of the Prosecutor Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization
on the Current Legal Framework, 43 COLUM. J. ENV’T. L. 181 (2018); INT’L CRIM. CT., THE
OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, POLICY PAPER ON CASE SELECTION AND PRIORITISATION (Sept.
15, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_CaseSelection_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK2C-FQ4P].
155 See generally Hari M. Osofsky, The Continuing Importance of Climate Change
Litigation, 1 CLIMATE L. 3 (2010) (analyzing the various ways that climate change
litigation in domestic courts is affecting transnational attempts to address climate
change); Hari M Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, The Role of Litigation in Multilevel Climate
Change Governance: Possibilities for a Lower Carbon Future?, 30 ENV’T & PLAN. L.J. 303
(2013) (comparing the ways that Australia and the U.S. have addressed climate
change in litigation and regulatory processes); Brian J. Preston, The Influence of
Climate Change Litigation on Governments and the Private Sector, 2 CLIMATE L. 485
(2011) (surveying the influence of domestic climate change litigation on decision
makers from the legislative and executive branches).
156
See Berat, supra note 20, at 343.
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IV. CONCLUSION
International criminal tribunals have long struggled to fit novel
harms into existing legal categories. Courts must balance the rights
of defendants to know in advance the charges they might face with
the reality that people have a seemingly endless ability to commit
novel atrocities in armed conflict. Without a legislature or other
body to define crimes, international criminal tribunals must strike
this balance while also attempting to do justice for victims and
perpetrators. The approach I advocate has the potential to
effectively accomplish these goals.
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